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INTRODUCTION

In 1975, the Minnesota Legislature created the Office of
Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) as an executive branch court. The
legislature intended to create an efficient, flexible, less-expensive, and
neutral forum to support—but not supplant—administrative agency
decision-making.1 Since that time, the legislature passed numerous statutes
placing final decision-making authority in OAH’s hands, rather than
† Ann E. Cohen is a senior staff attorney at the Minnesota Center for
Environmental Advocacy. Ms. Cohen received her B.A. from Yale University and J.D.
from New York University School of Law. Ms. Cohen previously spent thirty-two years
working for the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office representing the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency.
Elise L. Larson is a staff attorney at the Minnesota Center for Environmental
Advocacy. Ms. Larson received her B.A. from Concordia College, Moorhead and J.D.
from the University of Minnesota Law School.
The authors would like to thank their collegues at the Minnesota Center for
Environmental Advocacy, and former Chief Administrative Law Judge Beverly Jones
Heydinger, for their support and helpful comments.
1. Act of June 4, 1975, ch. 380, § 16, § 15.052, 1975 Minn. Laws 1285, 1293–95
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 14.001–.69 (2018)).
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having the courts or administrative agencies make those final decisions.2 In
doing so, the legislature created a questionable system where the powers
granted to OAH invade the provinces of the executive and judicial branch
established under the Minnesota Constitution.
This article explores the separation of powers concerns created
where the legislature gave OAH authority to make final decisions. The
article begins with a broad overview of Minnesota’s separation of powers
principles and the creation of OAH.3 The article then discusses cases
deciding claims where administrative courts interfered with judicial power
and explores how OAH’s authority to issue final agency decisions fits
under those precedents.4 Next, the article addresses separation of powers
concerns created when the legislature grants OAH final agency decisionmaking authority within the executive branch that can trump what would
otherwise have been another administrative agency’s decision.5 The article
concludes with suggested legislative actions that could be taken to protect
both OAH’s authority and the three separate, yet equal, branches of
government.6
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
One can only understand the constitutional concerns raised when
OAH acts as the final decision-maker by understanding the intersection of
the separation of powers concerns and the rise of administrative agencies.
“The separation of powers doctrine, as set out in the constitutions of both
the United States and Minnesota has roots deep in the history of AngloAmerican political philosophy.”7 The doctrine, as expressed by political
philosophers such as John Locke and Montesquieu, “is based on the
principle that when the government’s power is concentrated in one of its
branches, tyranny and corruption will result.”8 As explained in The
Federalist No. 47:

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Reginald

MINN. STAT. §§ 14.57–.70 (2012).
See infra Parts II, III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 222 (Minn. 1979) (citing
Parker, The Historic Basis of Administrative Law: Separation of Powers and
Judicial Supremacy, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 449, 451–64 (1957)).
8. Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. 1999); see also Wulff, 288
N.W.2d at 222–23 (noting that an administrative agency’s constitutionality is determined by
“a critical analysis of its function in conjunction with an examination of the doctrine of
separation of powers.”).
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The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny. . . . In order to form
correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to
investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires
that the three great departments of power should be separate
and distinct.9
Yet, separation of powers has never meant an “absolute division of
our government’s functions.”10 Said another way, the branches of
government are not completely separate, but operate through “institutional
interdependence.”11 Even the founding fathers understood the branches
could not function if totally divided.12 Consequently, the separation-ofpowers doctrine operates in a paradox—constitutional provisions mandate
separation even though complete separation is impossible to attain.13
In Minnesota, the separation of powers doctrine was adopted in
article III, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution, which reads: “The
powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments:
legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or
constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers
properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly
provided in this constitution.”14 Some scholars have interpreted the
constitutional language as “install[ing] a rigid separation of powers in
Minnesota,” perhaps more rigid than the U.S. Constitution.15 The
Democratic faction of the Minnesota Constitution’s framers drafted the
ratified language, and the preserved history of debates surrounding the
language indicates that the Minnesota framers both modeled the provision
9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob Earnest Cooke ed.,
1961).
10. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 723.
11. Id. at 723, n.20.
12. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 9, at 325 (“[W]e must perceive that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and
distinct from each other.”).
13. Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn. 1979) (noting that
Madison’s own statement “presupposes that some functions of one branch may be
performed by another branch without subverting the Constitution”).
14. MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
15. Philip P. Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative Committee Suspension of
Administrative Rules: The Case of Minnesota, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1237, 1246, 1256 (1986)
(“The Minnesota Constitution mandates a separation of powers at least as strict as that
required by the federal Constitution; indeed, the Minnesota scheme appears even more
rigid.”).
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after the constitutions of other states and “emphasize[d] the importance of
a strict separation of powers.”16 Since ratification in 1857, the separation of
powers provision has never been amended—even when the Minnesota
Constitution was generally revised in 1974.17
Despite this static constitutional language, Minnesota’s government
“has grown larger and more complicated.”18 One of those complexities is
“[t]he rise of the administrative agency”;19 in particular, administrative
agencies that resemble the type of power traditionally held by the
legislative, judicial, and executive branches.20 Such “blurred boundaries
between government branches” have increasingly made “the separation of
powers doctrine . . . harder to define.”21 OAH, in particular, is an
administrative agency that blurs the boundaries between the government
branches.22
III. A BRIEF LOOK AT OAH
Minnesota first adopted a version of the Minnesota Administrative
Procedure Act (“MAPA”) in 1945.23 Until 1975, MAPA required agencies
to administer administrative hearings either through department heads or
by hiring hearing examiners to develop a record of decision.24 Exacerbated
by increasingly complex law and authority, MAPA administration within
the agencies, at a minimum, gave the appearance of “kangaroo courts” due
to the “lack of procedural uniformity and expertise in conducting hearings,
delays due to unavailability, and manpower shortages in the agencies from

16. Id. at 1256 n.82 (citing W. ANDERSON & A. LOBB, A HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA 119 (1921); FRANCIS H. SMITH, THE DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 185–202 (1857)).
17. Id. at 1256 n.82, 1257.
18. Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. 1999).
19. Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn. 1979).
20. See id.
21. Holmberg, 558 N.W.2d at 723.
22. See id. at 722–23.
23. Duane R. Harves, Making Administrative Proceedings More Efficient and
Effective: How the ALJ Central Panel System Works in Minnesota, 65 JUDICATURE 257,
257 (1981); BRUCE H. JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF MINNESOTA ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES AND THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 2–15 (2011),
https://mn.gov/oah/assets/APAHistoryJohnson_tcm19-81576.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DH97LM8] (outlining administrative law origins in Minnesota and MAPA’s development
between 1949 and 1975).
24. Harves, supra note 23, at 257–58; JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 15.
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which the employee [decisionmaker] was drawn.”25 Further, there were
concerns that informal rulemaking went unexamined under a system
where agencies controlled the MAPA process.26 The culmination of these
concerns led the Minnesota Legislature to adopt the Act of June 4, 1975,
creating OAH and re-codifying MAPA in chapter 14 of the Minnesota
Statutes (“Chapter 14”).27
Under Chapter 14, the Minnesota Legislature adopted a “central
panel system,”28 creating an efficient, flexible, and less expensive forum for
decision-making29 and addressing concerns about agency impartiality,
consistency, and accountability in hearings and rulemaking.30 Chapter 14
establishes OAH as an executive branch agency.31 Under the new system,
OAH serves as a place where an aggrieved party can resolve administrative
disputes involving an executive branch agency, board, or commission
(“agency”) with the help of a neutral arbiter.32 OAH handles a wide variety
of cases, including utility rates, electric and natural gas transmission routes,
“child care and foster care license regulation, veteran’s preferences,
occupational safety and health, professional licenses, nursing home rates
and regulatory compliance, environmental permits, human rights,
personnel disputes involving government employees, fair campaign
practices complaints, municipal boundary adjustment matters, and other
challenges to state and local government action.”33 OAH also reviews the
need for and reasonableness of all rules proposed by state agencies.34

25. Harves, supra note 23, at 258; see also Raymond Krause, Minnesota’s OAH: 30
Years of Innovation in Administrative Review, BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 2006, at 17, 17–18
(describing Minnesota’s administrative process before 1975).
26. Harves, supra note 23, at 258; see also Krause, supra note 25, at 17–18
(describing concerns regarding Minnesota’s rulemaking procedures before 1975).
27. See Act of June 4, 1975, ch. 380, § 16, § 15.052, 1975 Minn. Laws 1285, 1293–
95 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 14.001–.69 (2018)).
28. Malcom Rich, Adapting the Central Panel System: A Study of Seven States, 65
JUDICATURE 246, 247 (1981) (examining the Minnesota system as a “central panel
system”); see also JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 17 (noting Minnesota was “the country’s fifth
independent central panel”).
29. Harves, supra note 23, at 260–61, 263–64 (discussing administrative flexibility,
cost reductions, and faster processing resulting from the Minnesota central panel system).
30. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 17.
31. Id.
32. MINN. STAT. § 14.50 (2018); see also JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 17 (labeling
central panel systems as “independent” and describing how Minnesota’s central panel was
created to ensure independence).
33. About Us, MINN. OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, https://mn.gov/oah/about-us/overall/
[https://perma.cc/9SCN-GT97].
34. MINN. STAT. §§ 14.14, subdiv. 2, 14.26, subdiv. 3, 14.50 (2018).
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From its creation, the legislature intended OAH to be independent
from the governor and other executive branch agencies.35 The legislature
placed OAH under the direction of the Chief Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) “who, in turn, was authorized to appoint a sufficient number of
other [ALJs] to conduct business.”36 Although the governor appoints the
Chief ALJ, the appointment requires the advice and consent of the
Minnesota Senate, and the Chief ALJ serves a six-year term—two years
longer than the governor’s term.37 The legislature aimed to ensure OAH’s
independence and developed a structure to insulate the Chief ALJ “from
any undue political pressure in terms of assigning certain persons to hear
specific cases, and from pressure to be sure decisions were rendered in a
certain fashion with predetermined results.”38 The legislature also
specifically sheltered ALJs appointed by the Chief ALJ from political
influence,39 and required that all ALJs “must be free of any political or
economic association that would impair their ability to function in a fair
and impartial manner.”40 Significantly, the legislature classified ALJs as
“employees in the state civil service and therefore subject to all of the
protections associated with that status.”41
In light of the independence Chapter 14 affords OAH from the
executive branch, ALJs generally do not render final decisions for another
executive branch agency. Instead, an ALJ’s role is to create the factual
record42 through a relatively informal and expedited proceeding,43 and

35. Bruce H. Johnson, Strengthening Professionalism Within an Administrative
Hearing Office: The Minnesota Experience, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 448–49 (2001); see
also Harves, supra note 23, at 259 (“The structure of [OAH] makes it an independent state
agency.”); Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 80 (1994) (noting Minnesota’s central panel is “housed in [a]
completely independent agenc[y] in the executive branch.”).
36. Johnson, supra note 35, at 448.
37. MINN. STAT. § 14.48, subdiv. 2.
38. Harves, supra note 23, at 259.
39. Johnson, supra note 35, at 449.
40. MINN. STAT. § 14.48, subdiv. 3(b).
41. Johnson, supra note 35, at 449; see also MINN. STAT. § 14.48, subdiv. 3(a) (“All
administrative law judges and compensation judges shall be in the classified service except
that the chief administrative law judge shall be in the unclassified service, but may be
removed only for cause.”).
42. MINN. STAT. § 14.50 (establishing an OAH is charged with providing procedural
due process, establishing a record, and issuing a recommendation). The dispute could be
over a specific matter. For example, a denied or revoked permit, a proposed rule, or
amendment to a rule. Regardless, OAH’s role is to establish a record. Id.
43. See MINN. R. 1400.7300 (2019) (simplifying the rules of evidence for OAH’s
contested-case hearings).
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make a recommendation to the executive branch agency with jurisdiction
to make the final decision (“jurisdictional agency”).44 Based on that record
and recommendation, the jurisdictional agency then decides the matter,
issues the final order, must defend that order on appeal, and must be
politically accountable for its decision.45 The jurisdictional agency is not
required to agree with the ALJ’s decision and, instead, makes an
independent decision based on the jurisdictional agency’s interpretation of
the facts in the record and its application of the law to those facts.46
However, the jurisdictional agency must defend its order on appeal and be
politically accountable for its decision.47 This decision represents the
executive branch’s final action, which the Minnesota Court of Appeals can
review under its writ of certiorari jurisdiction, if a complaining party
appeals.48 The court will uphold the jurisdictional agency’s decision where
it is supported by “substantial evidence” in the record, and notably, this
standard of review is not heightened where the jurisdictional agency’s final
decision differs from the ALJ’s recommendation.49
But this model has broken down. Now, parts of Chapter 14 and
other state laws50 make OAH the final arbiter of issues affecting executive
branch agencies, rather than allowing the agencies to make the final call.51

44. This article uses the term “jurisdictional agency” to refer to the agency that has
statutory authority and control over a particular area. For example, under section 93.481 of
the Minnesota Statutes, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources would be the
jurisdictional agency with regard to regulation of mining operations.
45. MINN. STAT. § 14.50.
46. MINN. STAT. § 14.15, subdiv. 3.
47. See id.
48. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 115 (2018). It is worth remembering that, at one point,
it was an open question whether the executive branch could decide its own disputes. In
Breimhorst v. Beckman, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the question of
whether the Minnesota Legislature’s delegation of adjudicatory powers to the Industrial
Commissioner violated the separation of powers. 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719, 733–34
(1949). The court held that it did not “as long as the commission’s awards and
determinations are not only subject to review by certiorari[] but lack judicial finality in not
being enforceable by execution or other process in the absence of a binding judgment
entered thereon by a duly established court.” Id. at 734.
49. See, e.g., In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624
N.W.2d 264, 278 (Minn. 2001).
50. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 13.085 (providing that OAH may issue an order,
including imposing penalties, if it finds that a government entity has violated the Minnesota
Data Practices Act). “A party aggrieved” by this decision can, however, appeal to the
Minnesota Court of Appeals, although not under Chapter 14. MINN. STAT. § 13.085,
subdiv. 5(d) (2018).
51. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 200.04, subdiv. 3; 216A.037, subdiv. 4; 442A.04.
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The Minnesota Legislature, perhaps hostile to the “administrative state,”52
or perhaps hostile to a particular governor, may start to favor such
arrangements.53 These statutes are the subject of this article.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS VERSUS THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
The Minnesota Supreme Court has had the opportunity to delve
into the constitutional intersection of administrative courts and the judicial
branch on a few occasions. In some occasions, but not all, the court has
held that assigning power to an administrative court to decide disputes was
unconstitutional under separation-of-power principles because the
administrative court improperly acted as a judicial-branch court.54
The court first faced the constitutionality of an administrative court
in Breimhorst v. Beckman.55 There, the court addressed whether the
Workman’s Compensation Act (“WCA”) violated the Minnesota
Constitution by encroaching on judicial power.56 Under the WCA, an
injured employee could only bring an employment injury claim before an
executive-branch commission rather than in district court.57 An injured
employee claimed, in part, that the WCA’s mandate that injured
employees use the executive-branch commission rather than the court
system violated the separation of powers.58 The court disagreed, holding
that vesting the executive-branch commission with quasi-judicial powers
did not violate the “state constitutional provisions for the division of the

52. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Is Trump Restoring the Separation of Powers, NAT’L
REV. (Nov. 20, 2017, 3:52 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/11/donald-trumpseparation-powers-solid-job/ [https://perma.cc/PL5B-KNSL]. It would appear that those
who are suspicious of agency actions would rather have judges decide the matters based on
their own interpretation of the law, rather than defer to agency interpretation.
53. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 15, at 1237. There are also statutes that attempt to
wrest executive powers to take rules back from the executive and place those powers with
legislative committees, or at least give legislative committees the authority to delay a rule
that the executive attempts to adopt. As many have already commented on the
unconstitutional nature of such provisions, and because such provisions are not directly
related to OAH, this article will not address these provisions.
54. Such conflicts may, in fact, result from administrative courts publicly presenting
that the administrative office performs a judicial function. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 35,
at 473 (“[S]trengthening professionalism necessarily involves taking steps that show the
public that [OAH’s] judges possess the requisite judicial qualities and that they do conduct
themselves in the ways that the public expects judges to behave.” (emphasis added)).
55. 35 N.W.2d 719 (Minn. 1949).
56. Id. at 732.
57. Id. at 724, 732.
58. Id. at 733–34.

484

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:2

powers of government or for the vesting of judicial power in the courts.”59
The court reasoned that “as long as the commission’s awards and
determinations are not only subject to review by certiorari, but lack judicial
finality in not being enforceable by execution or other process in the
absence of a binding judgment entered thereon by a duly established
court,” the commission did not unlawfully encroach upon the judicial
branch.60
Thirty years later, the court walked back this broad
pronouncement, concluding Breimhorst “mark[ed] the outside limit of
allowable quasi-judicial power in Minnesota.”61 In Wulff, the court
considered whether the legislature could, without infringing on the judicial
power, “constitutionally establish the Tax Court, an administrative agency,
as the sole arbitrator of tax disputes.”62 The court expressed serious
concerns with the tax court structure, both because the tax court did not
fulfill a pressing social need and “[u]nlike decisions of most administrative
agencies . . . which require judicial enforcement, Tax Court decisions,
upon filing, automatically become orders of the court.”63 Despite these
concerns, the court held the tax court did not violate the separation of
powers.64 The court based its holding on several factors. First, the subject
matter: Minnesota courts had consistently concluded taxation was
“‘primarily a legislative function,’” distinguishing taxation from other
administrative adjudications and allowing for “more latitude in permitting
such a delegation.”65 Second, under the statute, “the taxpayer always has
the option to file in district court. . . . perhaps the saving feature of this
statutory scheme.”66 Finally, the court observed that “any transfer to the
Tax Court is discretionary with the district court” and all tax court
decisions are subject to the “ultimate check on administrative power in the
form of review as of right in” the Minnesota Supreme Court.67 For these
reasons, the court determined the legislature did not “usurp judicial
functions nor deprive taxpayers of constitutional rights” with the creation
of the Tax Court.68
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
(1942)).
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 734.
Id.
Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn. 1979).
Id. at 222.
Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 224 (quoting State v. Erickson, 221 Minn. 218, 225, 3 N.W.2d 231, 235

Id. at 225.
Id.
Id.
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The court distinguished Wulff in the late 1990s with Holmberg v.
Holmberg.69 The issue raised in Holmberg was whether Minnesota’s
administrative child-support process “violate[s] the separation of powers
doctrine by impinging upon the original jurisdiction of the district court, by
creating a tribunal which is not inferior to the district court, and by
permitting child support officers to engage in the practice of law.”70 The
court described the “flexible review standard” for whether an
administrative court unlawfully encroaches on the judiciary.71 The court
summarized the standard as follows:
While supreme court decisions following Breimhorst have
relied, in part, on public policy to affirm legislatively created
administrative schemes, they have also been shaped by the
existence of adequate judicial checks on administrative actors,
the function delegated, ALJ decision appealability, voluntariness
of entry into the administrative system, and whether the
legislative delegation is comprehensive or piecemeal.72
Applying these criteria, the court determined the administrative childsupport process violated the separation of powers on three separate
grounds.73 First, the court concluded the process impinged on the
judiciary’s original jurisdiction as the legislature had “delegated to an
executive agency the [judicial branch’s] inherent equitable power” violating
article VI, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution.74 Second, the court
found the system violated article VI, section 3 of the Minnesota
Constitution, because the system gave ALJs “the power to modify district
court decisions,”75 making ALJs “‘on par’ with, if not ‘superior’ to the
district courts [the Minnesota Constitution] established.”76 Third, the
69. 588 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 1999).
70. Id. at 721.
71. Id. at 725.
72. Id. (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 726.
74. Id. at 725–26. The court also addressed the improper delegation of judicial
authority within the judicial branch in State v. Harris, 667 N.W.2d 911 (Minn. 2003).
There, the court found a statute allowing a chief district judge to appoint non-elected
judicial officers to any district court matter violated article VI, section 1 of the Minnesota
Constitution because the constitution mandates that non-elected judicial officers “be
inferior in jurisdiction to the district court.” Id. at 917–20.
75. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 726.
76. Otto v. Wright Cty., 910 N.W.2d 446, 455 (Minn. 2018). In Otto, the state
auditor challenged a state law permitting counties to choose their auditor. Id. The state
auditor, citing Holmberg, argued the statute violated the separation of powers because it
transferred “the executive department’s authority to control and conduct audits from a
constitutional officer to counties and private entities.” Id. at 454–55. The court disagreed,
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process “infring[ed] on the court’s exclusive power to supervise the
practice of law” by permitting non-lawyer, child-support officers to engage
in the practice of law.77 The court further concluded that appellate review
did not save the process from infringing on judicial powers because many
participants in the process lacked “the resources to mount an appeal”
under the “mandatory, albeit piecemeal, process.”78
Interestingly, despite OAH’s existence in its current form for more
than forty years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to analyze whether
OAH’s quasi-judicial decision-making—in any form—violates the
separation of powers because it encroaches on judicial power. But the
Minnesota Court of Appeals engaged in this inquiry in Riley v.
Jankowski.79 Specifically, the court considered whether a statute permitting
OAH to impose civil penalties for unfair campaign practices violated the
separation of powers by unlawfully infringing on the judicial branch.80 In
Riley, a political candidate filed a complaint with OAH alleging relators
disseminated false campaign material.81 An OAH panel held a two-day
evidentiary hearing and issued an order finding relators disseminated false
campaign material.82 The panel further ordered the relators to pay a civil
fine.83 Relators appealed, arguing the OAH hearing process was invalid
because, rather than deciding issues relating to an administrative agency,
distinguishing Holmberg on the ground that the state auditor retained “substantial and
substantive responsibilities in connection with county audits.” Id. at 455.
77. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 726. As discussed briefly infra Part V.B, the court
engaged on the intersection between administrative courts and the judiciary’s authority to
supervise the practice of law in Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744 (Minn.
1983). There, a statute allowed an administrative agency to set attorney fees in workers’
compensation cases. Mack, 333 N.W.2d at 750. In that case, the court held the statute did
not violate the separation of powers, reasoning the judiciary still had the authority to review
all attorney fee decisions and states around the country uniformly used this practice. Id. at
752–53. Twelve years later, the legislature amended the statute to create a “maximum
permissible fee” and limited the power of the court to evaluate the appropriateness to the
fee award. Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Minn. 1999). The Irwin court
held “[l]egislation that prohibits this court from deviating from the precise statutory amount
of awardable attorney fees impinges on the judiciary’s inherent power to oversee attorneys
and attorney fees by depriving this court of a final, independent review of attorney fees.” Id.
at 141–42. The court reasoned that it has an “inherent power to oversee attorneys and
attorney fees” and delegating attorney fee regulation to the executive branch violated the
separation of powers. Id.
78. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 726.
79. 713 N.W.2d 379, 382–83 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
80. Id. at 382.
81. Id. at 385.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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OAH considered individual complaints, determined factually whether
statutory provisions were violated, and issued a final decision, which to
relators, were all inherently judicial functions.84 Among other arguments,
relators asserted that the OAH process violated the separation of powers
because the OAH was not inferior to the district court, but rather on par
with district courts in deciding whether the statute was violated.85 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed, contending that, under
Breimhorst, the process did not violate the separation of powers because
the final administrative decision was reviewable by writ of certiorari.86
Furthermore, relators failed to “demonstrate[] that an order from an ALJ
panel is enforceable by execution or other process in the absence of a
binding judgment entered thereon by a duly established court.”87 The
court distinguished Holmberg, stating that “[u]nlike the ALJs in
Holmberg, [OAH] cannot modify a district court decision; their decisions
are not granted the same deference as a district court order on appeal; and
they do not take the place of the district court in criminal proceedings.”88
The Minnesota Court of Appeal’s reliance on Breimhorst, rather
than Holmberg, to analyze whether the unfair campaign practices statute’s
OAH process violated the separation of powers presents an interesting
dilemma. The Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly stated in Wulff that
Breimhorst marked the “outside limit of allowable quasi-judicial power in
Minnesota.”89 And, as laid out above, the Minnesota Supreme Court
expressed numerous factors which are relevant to the inquiry in
Holmberg, rather than the two Briemhorst factors the court relied on in
Riley, including “the existence of adequate judicial checks on
administrative actors, the function delegated, ALJ decision appealability,
voluntariness of entry into the administrative system, and whether the
legislative delegation is comprehensive or piecemeal.”90
Considering the Holmberg factors, the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
too, simply dismissed the separation of powers concerns presented in
Riley.91 For example, Holmberg suggests that courts consider
“voluntariness of entry into the administrative system” in determining

84. Id. at 387.
85. Id. at 392.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 395.
89. Id. at 388 (quoting Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223
(Minn.1979)).
90. Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Minn. 1999).
91. Id.
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whether an administrative process violates the separation of powers.92 In
fact, the Wulff court expressed that the tax court likely would have violated
the separation of powers, but-for the taxpayer’s option to file in district
court.93 Yet, when the Riley relator argued that OAH violated the
separation of powers because the system was involuntary, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals dismissed the argument on the ground that “involuntary
participation in an administrative process does not indicate a separation-ofpowers violation when a decision rendered in the administrative process is
subject to judicial review.”94 Such analysis completely disregards the court’s
reasoning in Holmberg, which rejected an administrative court system that
provided for judicial review.95
Another unanalyzed element in Riley that amounted to a saving
grace in Wulff was the “piecemeal” versus “comprehensive” system.96 In
Breimhorst, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted, in part, that it was the
comprehensive nature of the system that created fewer separation of
powers concerns.97 In contrast, the process in Holmberg did not pass
constitutional muster, in part, because the piecemeal system dealt with
only one portion of the custody and child support process.98 In Riley, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals cited Breimhorst as authority to distinguish
OAH’s authority regarding unfair campaign practices.99 But such an
92. Id.
93. Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at 225 (“It is crucial to note that the taxpayer always has the
option to file in district court. This is perhaps the saving feature of this statutory scheme.”
(citation omitted)).
94. Riley v. Jankowski, 713 N.W.2d 379, 394 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Meath v.
Harmful Substance Comp. Bd., 550 N.W.2d 275, 284 (Minn. 1996) (Anderson, J.,
concurring)).
95. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 726 (concluding appellate review did not save the
process from infringing on judicial powers).
96. Riley, 713 N.W.2d at 391 (quoting Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 724–25); Wulff,
288 N.W.2d at 225 (“[W]e find no violation . . . since an individual with a tax dispute does
not go remediless. A remedy is provided by the tax court, subject to and including judicial
review.”).
97. Breimhorst v. Beckmann, 277 Minn. 409, 433, 35 N.W.2d 719, 734 (Minn.
1949) (holding the Workmen’s Compensation Commission did not violate the separation
of powers “as long as the commission’s awards and determinations [were] not only subject
to review by certiorari, but lack[ed] judicial finality in not being enforceable by execution or
other process in the absence of binding judgment entered thereon by a duly established
court”).
98. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 726.
99. Riley, 713 N.W.2d at 395 (“[W]e conclude that the process is much more similar
to the process in Breimhorst, which the supreme court concluded did not violate the
separation-of-powers doctrine, than to the process that the supreme court invalidated in
Holmberg.”).
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analysis is inconsistent with the case law for two reasons. First, the process
in Riley was admittedly piecemeal, as a criminal process also existed to
punish the same conduct.100 Second, and more importantly, Breimhorst’s
analysis was directly called into question in Wulff.101 Thus, it is
questionable for the Minnesota Court of Appeals to affirm the process in
Riley on the ground that it is “much more similar to the process in
Breimhorst.”102
Consequently, the only case law addressing the constitutionality of
an OAH process where OAH acts as a final decision-maker is
questionable at best. However, the legislature is not without options. The
legislature could take steps to ensure the constitutional powers remain
separated, while still allowing OAH to act as a final decision-maker. The
Breimhorst court suggested that a comprehensive and permissive
administrative process that avoids matters within the traditional province of
the judiciary is far more likely to pass constitutional muster than a
mandatory, piecemeal administrative processes that meddles in subjects
traditionally controlled by the judicial branch.103
Having discussed the case law regarding administrative courts and
separation of powers from a judicial branch perspective, this article next
delves into the muddier realm of inter-executive branch conflict created
when OAH—or another independent administrative court—acts as the final
decision-maker.
V. OAH VERSUS THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Although the line is murky, as discussed above, Minnesota courts
have cabined administrative courts away from certain district court
functions based on the Minnesota Constitution’s provisions regarding
establishment of the courts. But this is only half the story. The other half
of the story is how OAH and other administrative courts function within
the executive branch.

100. See id.
101. Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223–24 (Minn.1979) (“Unlike
decisions of most administrative agencies, such as the one reviewed in Breimhorst, which
require judicial enforcement, Tax Court decisions, upon filing, automatically become
orders of the court. It is precisely this type of impingement by other branches of
government on the judiciary that concerns us. In view of the aforementioned, we are
reticent to approve such a legislative scheme.”).
102. Riley, 713 N.W.2d at 395.
103. See Breimhorst v. Beckmann, 277 Minn. 409, 433, 35 N.W.2d 719, 734 (Minn.
1949).
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Constitutional Powers of the Executive Branch

The Minnesota Constitution and the U.S. Constitution have similar
provisions governing the branches of government, including the powers
granted to the executive. Article II of the U.S. Constitution states that
“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America.”104 Under Article II, the president is given the authority and
responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”105
Minnesota’s Constitution is firmer in its division of the powers of
government into three branches, stating “[n]o person or persons belonging
to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the
powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances
expressly provided in this constitution.”106 But the executive’s authority
found in Minnesota’s Constitution is just the same as the U.S.
Constitution: the governor “shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”107
With the rise of the administrative state, federal courts confronted the
fact that the executive could not always run the show alone and, as a result,
gulped and swallowed on the theory that the president could not carry out
the executive power without the assistance of subordinates.108 The federal
courts concluded that delegation of authority is inconsequential so long as
the executive could control the subordinate officers, i.e., remove them
from office.109 A few years later, however, the Supreme Court conceded
that Congress can, under certain circumstances, create independent
agencies run by officers appointed by the president whom the president
cannot remove, except upon good cause.110
The independent-agency concept seemed to be settled law, but
apparently there are limits. In Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Board,111 the Supreme Court struck down a statute that required
“for cause” dismissal, but that also prevented the president from
determining whether such “good cause” existed. The Supreme Court
concluded the statute was infirm because it resulted in a “Board that is not
accountable to the President, and a President who is not responsible for
104. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
105. Id. § 3.
106. MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
107. Id. art. V, § 3.
108. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (citing precedent where federal
courts have reaffirmed the view of assistance by subordinates).
109. Id. (invalidating act preventing the president from removing executive officers).
110. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935).
111. 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010).
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the Board.”112 And in 2018, an en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit was
pressed to rescue a Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act provision providing the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s director with a five-year term in office, subject to removal by the
president only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office.”113 A panel decision that creatively held that such a director position
was unconstitutional because the agency head was a single person, not a
board necessitated the rescue.114 Now the Fifth Circuit has entered into the
fray by striking down the independence of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (“FHFA”) (in partial reliance on the D.C. Circuit panel decision in
PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) on the theory that
the FHFA was simply too independent to be constitutional.115
On the state side, there are fewer cases that explore incursions into
executive power. This may be because, as recognized by the Minnesota
Supreme Court:
Once they recognize even the general location of their limits,
Legislature and executive are alike careful not to come even
near an encroachment on each other’s domain. And if one
takes place, it is likely to be suffered in silence in order to avoid
open conflict. Especially is that so when the usurper is the
legislative power. The executive is ordinarily too dependent
upon the Legislature for appropriations, and too desirous of
generosity therein, to risk the disfavor of the money distributors
by resisting their invasions of executive domain. In
consequence, the executive policy of nonresistance may be
patient and endure much . . . .116
There are, of course, limits to what the legislature can do to
constitutional officers. “Independent core functions” of constitutional
officers cannot be abolished.117 But short of gutting the core functions,
Minnesota courts recognize that the power of the legislature under “Article
V of the [Minnesota] Constitution to ‘prescribe[]’ the ‘duties’ of executive
112. Id. at 495.
113. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 76–77 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(en banc).
114. Id. at 110. The overturned panel decision was authored by D.C. Circuit Judge
Brett Kavanagh, as was the underlying decision affirmed by the Supreme Court in Free
Enterprise Fund. As Brett Kavanagh now sits on the U.S. Supreme Court, he may be in a
position to push forward his view of executive authority.
115. Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 666 (5th Cir. 2018).
116. State v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 268, 220 N.W. 951, 955 (Minn. 1928) (holding
the Constitution puts the power to govern the University with the regents and a law giving
administration and finance agencies authority over the University was therefore invalid).
117. State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 1986).
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officers” includes the power to change those duties from time to time, at
least until an agency (such as OAH) runs afoul of powers given the
courts.118
OAH is, as previously noted, an independent agency by design.119
The Chief ALJ is appointed by the governor, has a six-year term, and can
only be dismissed “for cause.”120 Federal case law121 suggests that an agency
head who is not subject to executive authority could raise a constitutional
question, but this arrangement seems fairly safe under Minnesota
separation of powers jurisprudence.122 But constitutional questions may
arise when the legislature grants OAH the authority to make final
decisions in lieu of the agency that has jurisdiction over the programmatic
matter at issue,123 making OAH a “super-agency” over others within the
executive branch, outside the control of the executive.
To be clear, OAH is not now a “super-agency” except in a very few
areas. However, where the legislature has given OAH “super-agency”
powers, those grants might be seen as steps down the road to a troubling
incursion into the role of the executive under the constitution. Even short
of such unconstitutional usurpation, the OAH “super-agency” statutes
create confusing administrative law conundrums, as described below.

B.

OAH as a “Super-Agency”

The legislature has given OAH “super-agency” powers in a number
of different areas. OAH can, for example, determine whether an agency
has violated the Minnesota Data Practices Act and impose civil penalties.124
OAH can decide whether an agency has enforced, or attempted to
enforce, a guidance document, fact sheet, or the like as an
“unpromulgated rule.”125 OAH can award fees and expenses to be paid by
118. Otto v. Wright Cty., 910 N.W.2d 446, 455 (Minn. 2018) (citing Holmberg v.
Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999)).
119. Harves, supra note 23, at 259.
120. MINN. STAT. § 14.48, subdiv. 3 (2018).
121. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976), distinguished by McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
122. Quam v. State, 391 N.W.2d 803, 809 (Minn. 1986).
123. This article refers to the agency with authority over the program as the
“jurisdictional agency.”
124. MINN. STAT. § 13.085.
125. Id. § 14.385. Courts refer to administrative agencies’ enforcement of a policy or
guidance document that the agency has not formally adopted as a rule as adoption of an
“unpromulgated rule.”; see, e.g., In re Rate Appeal of Benedictine Health Ctr., 728
N.W.2d 497, 507 (Minn. 2007); St. Otto’s Home v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d
35, 42 (Minn. 1989). See generally GEORGE BECK & MEHMET KONAR-STEENBERG,
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a state agency upon an application of a party alleging that “the position of
the state was not substantially justified” in a contested-case hearing.126 OAH
also can decide whether a proposed agency rule is constitutional or within
the agency’s statutory authority if the agency attempts to adopt the rule
using the truncated “good cause” rulemaking procedures.127
In 1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court heard Mack v. City of
Minneapolis, a case that put into question whether the act of the legislature
imposing limits and allowing an administrative agency to set attorney fees
violated the separations of power guaranteed by article III, section 1 of the
Minnesota Constitution.128 The Minnesota Supreme Court easily batted
away this challenge on the ground that it could ultimately review all
attorney fees decisions.129 But Mack was followed by Quam v. State.130
Quam was another attorney-fees question, this time arising out of the
complicated scenario where a fee award by an ALJ under rules adopted by
OAH was set aside by the Workers Compensation Court of Appeals
(“WCCA”), another administrative body, on the grounds that OAH
lacked authority to adopt the rule OAH relied upon to award attorney’s
fees.131 The Minnesota Supreme Court decided that, despite the fact that
the legislature made WCCA the “sole, exclusive, and final authority for
the hearing and determination of all questions of law and fact arising under
the workers’ compensation laws,”132 the statutory grant of jurisdiction to
WCCA could not include the power to “adjudicate the adherence of
agency rules to their statutory parameters.”133 The court concluded that
“[t]his function is solely within the judicial province and cannot be
assumed by an agency tribunal without violating constitutional principles of
separation of powers.”134 The court later concluded that statutory limits on
attorney’s fees are unconstitutional because such limits encroach upon the
powers of the judiciary.135

MINNESOTA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE § 16.4.2 (3d ed. 2014). Courts generally will
not defer to or enforce an agency’s “unpromulgated rule.”
126. MINN. STAT §§ 15.471–.474 (2018).
127. Id. § 14.388.
128. 333 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1983).
129. Id.
130. 391 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1986).
131. Id. at 809.
132. MINN. STAT. § 175A.01, subdiv. 2 (1984).
133. Quam, 391 N.W.2d at 809.
134. Id.
135. Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 142 (Minn. 1999). For greater
discussion of Irwin, see supra note 77.
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So now the question arises, if WCCA cannot hold that an OAH rule
is invalid because that is a judicial function, can OAH adjudicate similar
questions of rulemaking authority involving another state agency? Can
OAH issue an order to that agency, or penalize that agency? If OAH can
decide questions of authority relating to another state agency or force it to
act in a manner that it deems contrary to its authorities, can that agency
appeal the OAH decision as it would if a court ruled against it?

C.

Appealing OAH Decisions

OAH has, of course, extensive powers with regard to rulemaking.
Under Chapter 14, agencies must establish the need for and
reasonableness of a rule.136 Before an agency can adopt a rule, it must
obtain OAH’s affirmation that the need for and reasonableness of a rule
has been established.137 Under the rules that govern its rulemaking
procedures, OAH may disapprove a rule if it finds that the rule is not
“rationally related to the agency’s objective or the record does not
demonstrate the need for or reasonableness of the rule,” or “exceeds,
conflicts with, does not comply with, or grants the agency discretion
beyond what is allowed by, its enabling statute or other applicable law,” or
“is unconstitutional or illegal.”138 If an agency disagrees with OAH’s
determination, it must:
[S]ubmit the proposed rule to the Legislative Coordinating
Commission and to the house of representatives and senate
policy committees with primary jurisdiction over state
governmental operations for advice and comment. The agency
may not adopt the rule until it has received and considered the
advice of the commission and committees. However, the agency
is not required to wait for advice for more than 60 days after the
commission and committees have received the agency’s
submission.139
After receiving this “advice,” the agency can adopt the rule regardless
of OAH’s opinion of its legality, much as an agency is authorized to do in
a contested case.140 Thus, although heavily and questionably eroded by the
“laying” required at the legislature, the jurisdictional agency retains the
136. MINN. STAT. § 14.14, subdiv. 2 (2018).
137. Id. at § 14.15, subdivs. 3, 4.
138. MINN. R. 1400.2100 (2019).
139. MINN. STAT. § 14.15, subdiv. 4; see supra text accompanying note 53 (stating that
a number of scholarly articles assert that this “laying” or “lodging” procedure is
unconstitutional).
140. MINN. STAT. § 14.62.
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final authority over the rule. Persons who might agree with OAH’s
opinion (or any “advice” from legislators), can facially challenge the rule at
the Minnesota Court of Appeals after the agency adopts it.141 These facial
challenges are limited to a “narrow area of responsibility, lest [the court]
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”142
Section 14.388 of the Minnesota Statutes is different, providing that
an agency can adopt a rule without following the “normal” notice and
comment rulemaking process (either with or without hearing) if the agency
finds “that the rulemaking provisions of this chapter are unnecessary,
impracticable, or contrary to the public interest.”143 However, even for a
“good cause” rule, OAH must “approve[] the rule as to its legality.”144
Chapter 14 also provides that OAH “shall determine whether the agency
has provided adequate justification for its use of this section.”145 The only
“appeal” the legislature provides from this type of OAH decision is this:
“If a rule has been disapproved by an administrative law judge, the agency
may ask the chief administrative law judge to review the rule.”146 Therefore,
Chapter 14 arguably makes OAH a super-agency over the final decision
about the legality of a “good cause” rule, in lieu of the jurisdictional
agency. If the ALJ disapproves an agency rule adopted pursuant to this
process, the only review provided in the statute is to the Chief ALJ.147 And,
as the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (“MPCA”) discovered in a
2017 matter, that decision was the end of the process, unless the agency
had the right to appeal OAH’s determination to the court of appeals.
The 2017 MPCA case began when the Minnesota Legislature
enacted legislation instructing MPCA to adopt a particular rule, with
permissive language allowing MPCA to adopt the rule using “good cause”
exempt rulemaking.148 Following the truncated “good cause” notice
process, MPCA submitted the proposed rule to OAH for review.149
Unfortunately for MPCA (or perhaps the legislature), the assigned ALJ,
affirmed by the Chief ALJ, determined that the proposed rule was in
conflict with the federal Clean Water Act and state authority that required
141. Id. § 14.44.
142. See Manufactured Hous. Inst. v. Pettersen, 347 N.W.2d 238, 244 (Minn. 1984)
(quoting Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 825 (Minn. 1977)).
143. MINN. STAT. § 14.388, subdiv. 1. This is referred to as “good cause” rulemaking.
144. Id. § 14.386 (a)(3).
145. Id. § 14.388, subdiv. 1(4).
146. Id. § 14.388, subdiv. 3.
147. Id.
148. Act of May 30, 2017, ch. 93, § 160, 2017 Minn. Laws 97–98.
149. See Adopted Exempt Permanent Rule of the Minn. Pollution Control Agency
Governing Mun. Effluent Limitations, OAH 19-9003-34654 (2017), 2017 WL 5662794.
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the MPCA to do what is necessary to keep its delegation to implement the
Clean Water Act. Thus, OAH concluded that the MPCA had failed to
establish the “legality” of the proposed rule.150 Based on this reasoning,
OAH declined to approve the rule.151
Although MPCA arguably could have “started over” following the
“normal” rulemaking process,152 MPCA instead sought and obtained a writ
of certiorari against OAH.153 This created an administrative law
conundrum: May one agency within the executive branch appeal the
decision of another agency within the executive branch—albeit one that
operates independently of the governor—without express statutory law
allowing such an appeal?
The cases provide no clear answer to this question. In 1989, the
Minnesota Racing Commission (“Racing Commission”) held a contested
case regarding discipline of a horse trainer and her employee for
administering prohibited drugs to their horses.154 The assigned ALJ
recommended against discipline of the trainer and her employee.155 The
Racing Commission accepted this recommendation with regard to the
employee (Haymes), but not with regard to the employer.156 Haymes then
attempted to recover attorney fees against the Racing Commission under
the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act (“MEAJA”).157 Under MEAJA,
in a contested case where the tribunal determines that the state’s position
is not “substantially justified,” the “court or administrative law judge shall

150. “However well-intentioned, the amendment conflicts with existing federal and
state laws and regulations and is illegal.” Id. at *10.
151. Id.
152. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 14.22. This would, of course, have likely resulted in the
same determination of illegality. But if the regular rulemaking process was followed, the
agency could adopt the rule after following the “laying” process dictated by section 14.26,
subpart 3(c), of the Minnesota Rules.
153. The Minnesota Attorney General represented both sides—MPCA and OAH—in
the appeal. This in itself poses an interesting question, but would likely pass muster. The
Attorney General can bring an action against an agency’s former director who was
represented by the Attorney General because the Attorney General is representing the state
agency, and not its former director. Humphrey v. McLaren, 402 N.W.2d 535 (Minn.
1987). The Attorney General can also represent both a department and its commissioner
in a contested case if separation of functions is maintained. Elim Homes, Inc. v. Minn.
Dep’t Human Servs., 575 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
154. In re Haymes, 444 N.W.2d 257, 257 (Minn. 1989).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 258.
157. Currently codified as MINN. STAT. §§ 15.471–.474 (2018), albeit without the
“MEAJA” title.
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award fees and other expenses to the party.”158 For contested cases, the
authority appears to be a grant of a super-power to OAH. While the
substance of the decision rests with the agency, OAH decides the question
of the fee award.
In Haymes, the Racing Commission did not agree with OAH’s fee
award and appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals under that court’s
discretionary review jurisdiction.159 The matter reached the Minnesota
Supreme Court solely on the issue of whether the court of appeals had
jurisdiction to entertain the Racing Commission’s petition for discretionary
review.160
In arguing for its right to appeal, the Racing Commission cited
Breimhorst and Wulff to assert that “under the separation of powers
clause of our state constitution, judicial review must be provided for
administrative agency decisions involving the exercise of quasi-judicial
powers.”161 The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that, where no
right of discretionary review had been provided by statute or appellate
rules, the Racing Commission was “an aggrieved party [which] has the
common law right to petition for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 120 and Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (1986).”162 The Minnesota
Supreme Court further concluded that OAH’s award of attorney fees was
a “quasi-judicial decision.”163 This reasoning seems questionable on a
number of grounds. First, it is not clear that state agencies have “common
law rights.” The power of a state agency is bound by its statutory
authority,164 although courts also sometimes find wiggle room by citing to
“the incidental powers necessary to accomplish the duties conferred on
[the agency].”165 Second, it is not clear that an attorney fees decision made
by a state agency upon application under MEAJA is a “quasi-judicial

158. MINN. STAT. § 15.472(a).
159. In re Haymes, 427 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); see MINN. R. CIV. APP.
P. 105.
160. In re Haymes, 444 N.W.2d 257, 258 (Minn. 1989).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 259.
163. Id. Ironically, despite these findings, the Racing Commission lost the case
because it had failed to obtain a writ of certiorari, but instead had brought a “petition for
discretionary review.” Id.
164. Waller v. Powers Dep’t Store, 343 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Minn. 1984) (“Neither
agencies nor courts may under the guise of statutory interpretation enlarge the agency’s
powers beyond that which was contemplated by the legislative body.”).
165. See, e.g., In re Qwest’s Wholesale Serv. Quality Standards, 678 N.W.2d 58, 67
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (Minge, J., concurring).
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determination.”166 The Minnesota Supreme Court has “recognize[d] that
the assessment of penalties and sanctions by an administrative agency is
not a factual finding but the exercise of a discretionary grant of power.”167
Although Haymes appears to authorize a state agency to appeal
OAH’s determination of attorney fees, a quasi-judicial determination,
allowing a state agency to appeal an OAH rulemaking decision (i.e., the
MPCA “good cause” rulemaking) seems a harder stretch. Rulemaking
seems to be the classic “quasi-legislative action” that affects the rights of the
public generally and is not specific to any particular set of facts.168 And is
one agency within the executive branch “aggrieved” when another agency
is given the authority to make a final decision? If the legislature made
OAH the “superior tribunal” within the executive branch for a particular
decision—for example, deciding the legality of a “good cause” rule—it
seems wrong to find that another agency within the executive branch can
be aggrieved by its decision. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that an
administrative agency does not have standing to appeal a decision made by
another agency or board sitting as a superior tribunal.169 Other statutes,
notably section 271.06 of the Minnesota Statutes,170 expressly permit
agencies to make appeals from administrative tribunal decisions. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized these express provisions as key
factors in whether an agency can pursue an appeal.171 Should the courts be
allowed to create a different path, as under Haymes?

166. Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Metro. Council, 587 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn.
1999) (“[T]he three indicia of quasi-judicial actions can be summarized as follows: (1)
investigation into a disputed claim and weighing of evidentiary facts; (2) application of those
facts to a prescribed standard; and (3) a binding decision regarding the disputed claim.”).
167. In re Haugen, 278 N.W.2d 75, 80 n.10 (Minn. 1979).
168. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 574
(Minn. 2000); Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 416 (Minn. 1981);
Anderson v. Cty. of Lyon, 784 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
169. City of St. Paul v. LaClair, 479 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. 1992); Minn. State Bd.
of Health v. Governor’s Certificate of Need Appeal Bd., 304 Minn. 209, 216–17, 230
N.W.2d 176, 181 (1975).
170. MINN. STAT. § 271.06 (2018) (permitting “any political subdivision of the state,
directly or indirectly, interested therein or affected thereby, or by the attorney general in
behalf of the state” to appeal a tax court decision).
171. Minn. Water Res. Bd. v. Traverse Cty., 287 Minn. 130, 134, 177 N.W.2d 44, 47
(1970) (“[R]ight of appeal depends largely on whether express provision is made in the
particular statute involved.”).

2019]

NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL

499

D. OAH Defense of “Final Agency Decisions”
Other problems arise when OAH makes the final decision for the
executive branch. An ALJ—as would be the case for any judge—has no
special expertise in the subject matter. Under longstanding Minnesota
precedent, when an expert agency makes a decision, a court will give
appropriate deference.172 When OAH makes the final decision, is it
entitled to the same deference? At least for Minnesota Government Data
Practices Act (MGDPA) unpromulgated rule cases173 heard before OAH,
the answer is no and yes. In Webster v. Hennepin County,174 the
Minnesota Supreme Court declared that it would not defer to the ALJ’s
conclusions in making a final decision under section 13.085 of the
Minnesota Statutes, but then applied the statutory substantial evidence
standard under section 14.69 of the Minnesota Statutes, which accords
essentially the same deference.175 While deference to an ALJ decision on a
MGDPA issue may not seem that odd, the question is certainly more
difficult where the subject matter of the dispute is specialized (say, a
science-based water quality standard or the appropriate accounting
method for a nursing home). In those cases, it does seem questionable to
rely on a single non-expert judge to make that decision rather than an
agency. Similarly, where a jurisdictional agency is operating pursuant to
delegated authority from the federal government, it seems problematic to
have another agency make the decision.176
Another practical problem that arises when OAH makes the final
decision involves OAH’s ability to defend its decision. Given OAH’s
“judicial” function, appearing in the appeal to defend its decision seems
akin to a district court judge appearing at the court of appeals to defend a
decision, rather than a litigant.177 Moreover, would OAH be able to mount
a full-throated defense of its decision given that it may lack expertise in the
172. Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (1977) (“We also adhere to
the fundamental concept that decisions of administrative agencies enjoy a presumption of
correctness, and deference should be shown by courts to the agencies’ expertise and their
special knowledge in the field of their technical training, education, and experience.”).
173. See supra text accompanying note 125.
174. 910 N.W.2d 420, 429 (Minn. 2018).
175. MINN. STAT. § 13.085, subdiv. 5(d) (“A party aggrieved by a final decision on a
complaint filed under this section is entitled to judicial review as provided in sections 14.63
to 14.69.”); Webster, 910 N.W.2d at 429.
176. For example, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency is delegated the authority
to issue permits and establish water quality standards required by the federal Clean Water
Act. See MINN. STAT. § 115.03, subdiv. 5. Can OAH make the final decision on a rule
proposing a new water quality standard if it does not hold this delegation?
177. See Johnson, supra note 35, at 473.
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matter?178 Even where OAH makes a decision favorable to an agency,
generally the agency—not OAH—defends the decision on appeal.179
However, OAH’s entry into the case may involve intervention or a
separate appeal.180
Unfortunately for this article, the Minnesota Court of Appeals did
not rule on the 2017 MPCA “good cause” rulemaking matter due to
legislative action that mooted the appeal before making a decision.181
Nevertheless, the MPCA matter illustrates that, by making OAH a superagency within the executive branch, troubling complexities of
administrative law result.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the confusion that results when OAH is given final decision
authority, the wisdom of providing such authority to OAH must be
questioned. Where the authority of administrative courts strays into the
area designated to the judiciary, the courts have stated that they will abstain
from interference based on several factors. Those factors include the
“existence of adequate judicial checks on administrative actors, the
function delegated, ALJ decision appealability, voluntariness of entry into
the administrative system, and whether the legislative delegation is
comprehensive or piecemeal.”182 Yet, in spite of these limitations, the
legislature continues to push the limits of the separation of powers
doctrine by continuing to give OAH authority that encroaches upon the
express province of the judiciary.
Courts seem more at sea as to how to deal with statutes that give
OAH administrative super-power over other jurisdictional agencies within
the executive branch. These statutes create a host of legal issues not easily
178. See, e.g., Petition of Brenda Loewen, No. 1-1800-14925-2, 2002 WL 31303618,
at *3 (Minn. Off. Admin. Hearings Aug. 1, 2002). The Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) argued that if OAH issued an order prohibiting DHS from enforcing a statute (as
included in its disputed manual), that action “would violate the separation of powers clause
of the Minnesota Constitution.” Id. If OAH ordered DHS to cease enforcing its statute,
and DHS did not, would an action in district court be the result? See id. Would the district
court reconsider the question in order to maintain “judicial control” over the executive
branch agencies? See id.
179. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. of Minn., Inc. v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, No.
A14-0122, 2014 WL 3892576, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2014) (demonstrating how
the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency appeared by a “related appeal” created by the
filing of a separate writ against it).
180. Id.
181. Act of May 30, 2017, ch. 93, § 160, 2017 Minn. Laws 97–98.
182. Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Minn. 1999).
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untangled. Beyond these issues, the stakes increase significantly –
particularly for the jurisdictional agency, but also for the opposing party –
if an OAH decision becomes the final decision. If one of the legislature’s
objectives in creating OAH as an administrative court was to simplify the
process for decision-making, some of that simplicity may be lost. Making
OAH the decision maker moves OAH closer to resembling a district
court with all the associated burdens and costs. Finally, it is worth bearing
in mind that OAH is not under political control by the governor. If the
legislature transfers across-the-board broad powers to an executive agency
not under the governor’s control, are constitutional questions raised, as
they have been in federal decisions?
Because of the problems created when OAH is given judicial-like
powers and broad authority over other executive branch agencies, the
legislature should think twice when granting such powers. For matters
encroaching on the judiciary, simple changes to the process are more
likely to pass constitutional muster. These changes include making the
system comprehensive, permissive, and governed by clear judicial
oversight. These changes are preferable over mandatory administrative
processes that only address a small portion of an administrative or legal
scheme and delve into areas traditionally controlled by the judicial branch.
For cases where OAH must resolve disputes involving other agencies
within the executive branch, the better model is likely the one that is used
for other OAH decisions under Chapter 14. Using this model, the
opinion of the ALJ is only advisory, and the state agency must make the
final call, subject to review by certiorari at the Minnesota Court of
Appeals. If there is a particular reason to grant OAH the ultimate power
to decide a matter, the grant of that power must be done with thoughtful
safeguards, including clear authority that enables a state agency to appeal
the OAH decision.
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